

Analyzing the Impacts of Non-State Actors in Providing Security in Borno State, Nigeria: A Case of the Civilian Joint Task Force

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Abstract

In Africa, discussions of Non-State Actors defending their host communities is not new to security studies. Having experienced so many wars and conflicts since the end of colonialism, most African societies have been forced to take up arms in protection of their communities. The outcome has been, in some cases positive and in others negative. While focusing on the Civilian Joint Task Force in Borno State, Nigeria, this paper analyzed the concept of Non-State Actors; a concept that encompasses not just a small group but also international organizations. This paper proposed that Non-State Actors, like in many other states, were fostered based on the inability of the legitimate authority to provide adequate security for the life and property of its citizens. Raging from positive to negative, this paper critically analyzed the impacts of Non-State Actors on security in Borno State. The use of injudicious power seemed to be the major challenge of the Civilian Joint Task Force. However, the paper concludes by proffering a better way to engage Non-State Actors in the security sector.

Keywords: Non-State Actors, Civilian Joint Task Force, Security, Community Policing.

Introduction

In order to understand the impacts of Non-State Actors (NSAs) on security, it is important to understand who they are. According to Hefer et al. (2012), NSAs are any form of organizations or bodies that are not recognized as independent and sovereign states. They posit that NSAs can be classified into two major categories; international organizations (Red Cross, United Nations and so on) and state formations, such as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) of Borno State. It's important to note that NSAs, in general, can be on either side of the security spectrum. In other words, they can either be the cause of insecurity or the solution to insecurity. For the longest time, Africa has been plagued with so many challenges since the end of colonial rule. One of the major challenges is maintaining a balance in the security sector. The continent has witnessed violence crimes, genocides, wars, xenophobic attacks, and terrorism. NSAs arise when there is an imminent need to serve and protect the people; a need that the legitimate security forces have failed to meet. Albrecht and Buur (2009) connote that in the case of most African nations, there are a number of commonalities that cause for the sedition of NSAs. Some of these factors are; the lack of strong institutions, high level of illiteracy, poverty, overpopulation and weak economies. They claim that NSAs, in whatever sector they operate (health, education, environmental, and security) only arise when there is a gap between good governance and citizenry.

The importance of NSAs cannot be undermined, however, they have witnessed numerous problems for host communities, especially in Nigeria. This mainly stems from the fact that they have no constitutional provisions and cannot be held accountable for their actions since they are the only body that provides direct security in most parts of the nation. Denney (2014) posits that members of

the CJTF have on different accounts been accused of using excessive force to maintain order in Borno state.

For the longest time, so many scholars have argued on the rationality of community policing in line with NSAs. It is a fact that community policing works in some parts of the world; however, it has failed immensely in other parts of the world. While critically analyzing the impact of the CJTF, this paper sets out to contribute to the ongoing discussion on the probability of legitimizing NSAs and transforming them into community police. The objective of this paper is to examine the impacts of the CJTF, both negative and positive while trying to reach a dichotomy on the importance of their presence in Borno State.

In understanding the impacts of NSAs, a better narrative is given in understanding the impact of the CJTF on national security; hence answering the question on whether groups like the CJTF should be considered for community policing in their distinctive locale. This paper prepositions that the disadvantages that come with engaging NSAs arise from the fact that they have no constitutional provision. Meaning that, if NSAs like the CJTF was imbibed in the constitution, they would be answerable to the Nigerian government for their injudicious acts.

Hence, this paper will begin by discussing the Defense Realism, giving ground to why NSAs become active in a community where the rule of law is being abused. Furthermore, this paper would analyze the negative and positive impacts of the CJTF and make a case study based on empirical studies, for community policing.

Conceptual and Theoretical Approach to Understand the Need for NSAs in Security

The involvement of NSAs in the security sector has been rising phenomenally since the end of the Second World War and the emergence of the United Nations. As stated earlier, NSAs can fall on either side of the security spectrum; be the originators, or propagators of existing violence or acting as an aid to ending such violence. In other words, they can be violent or counter violent in nature. Nevertheless, the emergence of NSAs in many societies are responses to different complications in national security. According to Hill et al (2007) 'Life in many societies is defined by insecurity caused in part by a lack of formal public security. In more than a dozen countries, formal security mechanisms barely exist or are entirely absent...In many others, there may be some formal security but it is often ineffective or available only in certain geographic areas' (2012, p. 38).

Since the beginning of Nigeria's fourth republic in 1999, the country has suffered immense security challenges. The country has recorded deteriorating security levels since its inception. However, these are challenges that can be dated back to the civil war that started in 1966. Most recurring crimes in Nigeria include kidnappings, robbery, home invasion, human trafficking and now, terrorism. Traditionally, the security of the state lies within state structures and institutions and at the frontline of defense, the country's first response is the Nigerian Police Force which is national police (Like most police forces in West Africa). The Nigerian Police Force is tasked with the primary objective of providing security in every part of the country.

However, due to the rising security challenges and growing humanitarian crisis all across the country, the Nigerian government has been forced to utilize whatever means necessary to provide security. This has given room for the active involvement and engagement of NSAs by the Nigerian government. Since then, a significant number of NSAs have been operating in Nigeria's security system. Denney (2014) refers to this inevitable uprising as the inevitable Plurality of security forces. This is often due to the weakness or inefficiency of legal state-recognized institutions to provide security. Denney (2014, p.251) states that;

Despite a high degree of awareness that security and justice are routinely provided by a plural set of actors in the 'global South', donor-supported reforms of the security and justice sectors remain overwhelmingly state-centric in focus. This is

facilitated in part by the belief that plurality exists primarily because of state weakness, and that as the state delivers improved security and justice services, alternative providers will cease to be relevant.

This simply means that NSAs usually arise in situations where legitimate state actors have ultimately failed in providing the services they were created for. However, some scholars like Hazbun (2016) believe that inefficiency is not the only reason why NSAs arise. The political instability of any nation-state can lead to a decline in security. While looking at the in-depth correlation of political stability in Lebanon, Hazbun (2016) suggests that the instability of Lebanon's politics and political economy has made the state weak and in turn given way for crime and injustice; which it has also weakened the strength of Lebanon in a regional context. This can also be seen in the case of Nigeria. In her fifty-nine years' post-independence, Nigeria has had a total of nine coups and four transitions to democratic rule. However, the last transition, which took place in 1999 has been the longest transition with uninterrupted twenty years of democratic rule. This complicated history has created a vacuum in the security sectors as the Nigerian state has weakened the constitution by continuously suspending it.

There is wide spread effect of insecurity on the edge states and country but not only Borno State;

Economic downturn of the nation is attributable to the economic losses in the affected zones due to dislocation of businesses and investments that had to be moved out completely or destroyed by the insurgents' activities. National resources that are to be used to enhance economic activities in other geo-political regions are harnessed and sent to the insurgent-prone areas to acquire arms, ammunition and other military hardware. The mass movement of people away from these areas has also created congestion at the urban centres and misuse of public amenities and infrastructures can only be imagined. Sanitation and upkeep of the internally displaced persons have suddenly become humanitarian emergency situation. (Celik, Jelilov and Ephraim, July 2019)

Similarly, Lar (2015) proposes that these NSAs emerge in efforts to compensate for the government weaknesses and address certain security challenges. In a state like Nigeria, the existence of these groups have been regarded as part of history. Most ancient societies in Nigeria and Africa have been known to have strong men defending their royalties and their inherent kingdoms which date back to pre-colonialism. Lar (2015) points out that the opposition to NSAs in the security sector has not been matched with enough evidence to categorically understand their impacts on security in Nigeria.

However, Ebo (2012) believes that NSAs play a very fundamental role in the peacebuilding of any post-war society. Their impacts on security governance have been recorded to be effective in rebuilding societal structures. For instance, in the case of Rwanda, the intervention of the United Nations and other local groups like the Rwanda Patriotic Front was said to have had a great impact on the peacebuilding of the post-war society. Although Bowie (2016) argues that internal actors had their own private agenda, which might not favor society at large but may favor smaller interest groups.

It is important to note that every state is conscious of its internal security. The failure of a state to provide security creates a void that NSAs fill. One of the major reasons the concept of 'state' exist is to provide security for the lives and property in its particular territory. It is this protection that aligns the reasoning behind the social contract as explained by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jack Rousseau. Therefore, when a State begins to fail in its primary objective; a contingency plan is almost inevitable in a failed State.

Hence, the theory of Defense Realism, formulated by Kenneth Waltz explains the inevitability of NSAs in the security sector. Defense Realism is a structural theory of international relations that theorizes that the power struggle in the international systems allows for States to adapt, create and

moderate policies that allow them to attain maximum internal security. This theory has been used to justify the acquisition of nuclear weapons by powerful nations. The theory asserts that the creation of defensive mechanisms only arises from the existence of an offensive realism which is imminent in the international system. In other words, Waltz proposed that states conform and react to the threats they face internally and externally, which leads them to operate on contingency plans and NSAs are a form of contingency to deal with the alarming conflict.

Similarly, Davis (2009) theorizes that the statism cannot be separated from defense realism. In the sense that defense realism signifies the nature of a state as an actor while statism refers to the belief that a state should be able to control its affairs (economic, political, social and cultural) externally and internally. In other words, it is almost natural for groups of people to come together in defense of their community. Davis (2009, p. 226) states that:

...in order to defend or establish its sovereignty, a state engages in warfare (usually against other existent or putative states), with inter-state violence fueling both the fires of warfare and modern state-formation...This dynamic could readily describe the sets of allegiances, loyalties, and impacts of guerrilla forces and other more conventionally defined non-state armed actors who might conceptualize themselves as an alternative 'imagined community' of rebels fighting against an oppressive nation-state, as seen in Sudan, Somalia, Congo, and other countries caught in the vicious cycle of civil war or politicized armed conflicts.

Therefore, in theory, it is only formidable that groups that show the propensity to either pose violence or control violence in communities become active during a conflict. These groups are often compensated by state forces since they complement the security gaps that the legitimate authorities cannot bridge.

Security Governance in Borno State and the CJTF

The concept of security governance has become a widespread topic in international relations. With the fourth wave of terrorism engulfing the international system, directly and indirectly, every State's top concern is providing adequate security for its citizens. According to Ebo (2012, p. 53):

Security governance refers to the process of steering the state and society ideally but not always under effective democratic control towards the realization of individual and collective freedom from fear. The various actors' direct affairs in ways that complement their interests and perceptions in compliance or non-compliance with commonly accepted norms and their role in security governance are therefore positive or negative.

Simply put, security governance involves a lot of actors, who may have different expectations and which can also lead to the degradation of security. In the case of Borno State, it can be said that almost all Civil Society Organizations have a similar expectation from the government towards ending the Boko Haram longevity in the North East region of Nigeria.

Borno State is one of the most diverse states in Nigeria. It is predominated by the Kanuri people but also has other ethnicities of Hausa, Bura and the Shuwa Arabs. It is made up of eight local government areas. The major religions of the State are mainly Islam and Christianity. However, there are other groups of traditional worshipers situated in smaller villages by the Lake Chad basin.

The violence in Borno State is not significant to the uprising of Boko Haram. Borno state has been known as a hub for religious and cultural violence, which is widespread violence across Nigerian states. However, the uprising of Boko Haram ushered in a new wave of insecurity that the Nigerian government wasn't equipped to combat (Akinola, 2015). Boko Haram had been terrorizing the Nigerian state for at least two years when the infamous abduction of the Chibok girls occurred. The

kidnapping of 200 girls from their school and the inability of the Nigerian government to successfully rescue all of them till date remains one of the most sensitive attacks carried out by the group.

Boko Haram has been solely responsible for the deaths of over 5,000 people and the displacement of 2.2 million people within and outside Nigeria (UNHCR, 2018). The execution of humanitarian workers by Boko Haram has also made it difficult and dangerous for international NSAs to intervene in the region. The terrorist activities have discouraged investors in the region and have unavoidably increased poverty and epidemics. Most citizens have had to flee their homes to live in Internally Displaced People's camps. These camps are either provided by the host State or the Federal government. However, the conditions of the camps have been recorded as degrading to human life as cases of malnutrition and sexual violence subjugate these camps (UNHCR, 2018).

In its bid to declare a sovereign Islamic state, Boko Haram has resolved in using some tactics such as the seizure of land; kidnapping of young girls; negotiations for the lives of their member while exchanging for the girls they've kidnapped; sophisticated weapons and the use of suicide bombers, to achieve its goals. This attempt has been very impactful as to how the Nigerian government has chosen to respond to conflict in a defensive counter-terrorism mechanism. By taking this approach, the Nigerian government forms the Joint Task Force which is a state institution that includes collective unification of state forces present to combating terrorism, such as, the Army, Navy, Airforce, Police and Civil Defence (Weeraratne, 2017).

Thus, in actuality, the creation of the Joint Task Force wasn't efficient enough to reduce and counter the attacks of Boko Haram in the state. Weeraratne (2017, p. 626) argues that 'the decaying infrastructure, deteriorating democratic accountability, and inadequate capacity of the security forces (amongst others) are emblematic of the pervasive failures of successive Nigerian governments and have facilitated Boko Haram's cooptation'. This is why and how the CJTF was created by civil society organizations in Maiduguri.

The CJTF consists of a group of militants formed in 2013 to support the Nigerian government topple Boko Haram Insurgency from Borno State and the North East. The group is said to have over 26,000 members with roughly 23% being women. The group is known to possess weapons which have been approved for their use by the Borno and Yobe State government. The group has been involved in combat with members of the Boko Haram Insurgency that has led to the demise of more than a thousand of its member. Some members of the CJTF receive a salary, which is paid by the Borno State government (Raji et al, 2015). Just like every Non-State Actor in the security sector, this group has been met with various challenges and has been accused of taking part in extra judicious killings of suspected Boko Haram members without ensuring that the legal process takes place. Using the CJTF, the next section would be examining the impacts of NSAs in security governance.

CJTF and Positive Impacts of NSAs in Security Governance

Non-State Actors such as the CJTF in Borno State of Nigeria add immensely to the security and maintenance of peace and order. To begin with, the CJTF have been regarded as the first responders to the crisis in Borno State. Eke (2015) stated that the CJTF has proven to be very important in the fight against Boko Haram. Raji et al. (2015) recounts that 'In November 2013, a contingent of CJTF repelled insurgents at Dawashi Village in Kukawa Local Government Area of Borno State and killing about 25 insurgents despite their lack of counterinsurgency combat proficiency and expertise. They have helped to arrest about 120 insurgents who had escaped after the attack on Giwa barracks in 2010' (2015, p. 199).

The inevitability of NSAs to arise in conflict situations is imminent. The Defense Realism theory assumes States as primary actors and would do anything to protect its territory and ensure state survival. This includes participating in joint security and the creation of local groups to maintain security. The creation of the CJTF is a defensive approach in dealing with the insecurity in Borno

State. Denney (2014) assures that the involvement of local groups can be advantageous since they are more familiar with the community and its people. Although, some scholars argue that the involvement of NSAs would create a plurality of security that most developing countries, like Nigeria, are not properly equipped to handle. Denney points out that:

Beyond arguments that a plurality of security and justice providers exist because of state weakness, some alternative providers are also popular because of the strong links to culture and tradition that they provide, as well as the greater congruence between alternative providers and the social attitudes and norms of communities. This can grant such providers a legitimacy that the state and there, at times, seemingly foreign laws can lack. This connection to prevailing norms is important because it suggests that alternative security and justice providers to the state are not necessarily going to disappear when the capacity and willingness of the state to provide services improves or strengthens (2014, p. 254).

In other words, if the state remains relatively weak in providing security or any other social amenities for its citizens, NSAs are bound to erupt on operate. The CJTF which is made of indigenous people of Borno State have been able to lead attacks jointly with the state institution and their skills have been required in mapping out attacks against Boko Haram. Akinola (2015) agrees that the contribution of the CJTF in the fight against Boko Haram has been significant, enough so that the Nigerian government has awarded members some financial funds to compensate for the loss of lives and medical needs.

Also, two major driving factors for the recruitment of young boy and girls into Boko Haram remain poverty and unemployment. Before the dominance of Boko Haram, Borno State was among the 10 poorest states in Nigeria. However, the emergence of Boko Haram has allowed for the inflow of more resources into the state to tackle insecurity. This inflow of resources has in no way improved the living conditions of citizens of the state. While conducting a study that involved ex-Boko Haram members, Mercy Corps (2018) discovered that the reasons why young boys and girls joining the terrorist sect are the reason that existed way before the crisis. Mercy Corps was able to outline that there is two major reason young people join Boko Haram. Some boys admitted that they joined the terrorist group to provide for their families since they had no income and others admitted to joining due to peer pressure. The fact that NSAs can fall on either side of the security spectrum also implies that members of these groups can also choose to fall on either side of the spectrum. The CJTF offers a counter approach to this narrative. The CJTF has proven to be a safe haven for youths in Borno State. Of its 26,000 members, 62% have been recorded as youths below the age of 35. The CJTF has utilized the youths in Borno state by engaging them in combat with Boko Haram. The CJTF takes the responsibility of inducting these youths and training them on how to attack and retreat (Montclos, 2016).

Most NSAs that function in the security sector serve as a direct link between the state institutions and the people. Hill et al. (2007) posit that most communities, especially in developing countries tend not to trust most state institutions. Also, there have been cases where people who trust state institutions have been punished by terrorist groups thereby discouraging others to come forward with relevant information. The inability of the state to control the violence brings distrust between the state agents and the citizens. The CJTF serves as a bridge to this gap and disconnect between the people and the state. The CJTF has also proven to be a reliable source and major hub of information in Borno state. Given that they do now wear uniforms, they have been successful in blending into different communities and gathering information for the state institutions. The infamous 2014 attack led by the Nigerian Army into Sambisa forest, the camp of Boko Haram in 2014 was based on information provided by the CJTF. The Nigerian Army has also acknowledged and recognized in

several press briefings the influence of the CJTF in their efficiency of carrying out attacks against Boko Haram in the state.

Due to the casualty rate caused by Boko Haram attacks, the confidence citizens have in the Nigerian government has also been weakened. For example, in Akwa Ibom State, the performance small business in Ikot Ekepen Local Government is very low since shops and business centers closed early and some of the shops or small centers experienced army robbery activities after they have closed (Opusunju, Akyuz & Ibrahim, 2019). People have lost confidence in the Nigerian and Borno state government and armed forces to protect their lives and properties. The extrajudicial killings of state forces have also made the people drift father away from cooperating with state forces as they believe that no investigation is being carried out to justify the killings of suspected Boko Haram members. The CJTF on the other hand is viewed as a more trusted body since they are made up of fellow civilians and have the ability to gain information without the use of force, threats or extrajudicial killings. Merz (2010) argues that NSAs all over the world have received a wide range of attention from scholars because of their ability to meet security needs that the legitimate state forces have failed to meet. In this case, many developing nations struggle with control of its citizens and end up using force to gain control. This is major gap that is being filled by NSAs such as the CJTF in conflict areas such as North East Nigeria. In the case of Nigeria, Merz (2010) points out that since the end of military rule in 1999 and the transition into democratic rule, the Nigerian military and security forces have been poorly positioned. This has inevitably created so many security challenges whereby violence erupts almost every year since 1999 due to different factors such as elections, community clashed, use of excessive force and so on. These security challenges magnified the strengths and weaknesses of the Nigerian government in dealing with security issues and created a gap that could only be filled by NSAs such as the CJTF, who end up playing a vital role in restoring peace. Weiss et al (2013) proposed that 'NSAs have not only participated in global governance but have also been involved in its construction. The so-called third wave of democratization has facilitated the growth of NSAs in global governance' (2013, p. 13)

One of the major challenges that has faced the North Easter region is the slow response and poor intelligence gathering of the Nigerian government and the Armed Forces. The CJTF has been known for their rapid response to crimes. The fact that they are untrained and look like normal civilians has allowed for their successful penetration into high tensioned areas to gather information that has proven too tough for the Nigerian forces to explore. In a research carried out by Center for Civilians in Conflict (2018), most respondents admitted that the CJTF has not only been a form of security in Borno State but have also been very involved in assisting Boko Haram survivors in their daily activities. They help to run errands and also serve as helping arms in gaining financial assistance from neighbors and strangers.

The Boko Haram experience in the north East has led to a massive flow of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Many people have been forced out of their homes to settle in other relatively safe communities. However, these camps have been known to face some challenges. For instance, in 2013, Daily trust records that there have been various kidnappings of young boys and girls from the camp. The culprits, assumed to be Boko Haram, were never caught. Nevertheless, the CJTF assumed responsibility for the protection of Internally Displaced Persons. They started a patrol watch that excurts children to and from schools and market places.

The CJTF also takes part in security scans and body searches of individuals in market places, IDP camps and public building. In 2013, Boko Haram advanced its tactics on suicide bombers, mainly using young girls with long hijabs as they are rarely suspected, touched or checked based on gender and religious believes. According to Waliyat (2018)

By late 2015 the scale of Boko Haram female suicide attacks was already globally unprecedented.186 Boko Haram deployed its first female suicide bomber in an

attack on a military barracks in Gombe State in June 2014, and since then it has far outstripped any previous terrorist group's deployment of FST, whether religious or secular. As of February 28, 2018, a recorded 469 females "suicide bombers" have been deployed or arrested in 240 incidents, and they have killed more than 1,200 people across four countries: Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Almost 3,000 more people have been injured (2018, p. 33).

Some of these young women have been believed to be abducted and used against their will to carry out these attacks. The National Emergency Management Agency (2018) states that there have been 27 female suicided bombers and over 39 suicided bombings in Borno State since the emergence of Boko Haram in 2009. However, the CJTF has been instrumental in disarming detecting and disarming 5 suicided bombers since 2012. They have been actively involved in setting up road blocks and conducting vehicular search.

CJTF and Negative Impacts of NSAs in Security Governance

In international relations, realist proposes that the anarchical nature of the international system propagates a struggle for power between nation-states. To the realist school, power and national interest are the most important factors in state control. Therefore, the dilution of power allows for plurality, which in turn possess a new form of threat to national security. Some scholars of realism, like believe that if power is distributed between state and NSAs, the future of the state would be unpredictable. This unpredictability of the actions of NSAs has led to various crimes being committed with no one to bear the consequences. For instance, the Yugoslavian war of 1992 was characterized by the involvement of many NSAs. These groups, despite fighting the opposition were recorded for committing so many war crimes such as rape, genocide and recruiting child soldiers. This has also been the case of the CJTF, who has been accused of stealing from members of the community and also involving children in the CJTF.

The CJTF has been accused of committing so many crimes that are not far-fetched in a warring state. One of the major problems they have posed is the extrajudicial killings of civilians. The Center for Civilian in Conflict (2018) states that '...in Bui, one of the ways in which yan gora (CJTF) members sought to safeguard communities was by going house to house, asking people to give up their own children if suspected of association with JAS, burning their houses if they did not do so, and killing those suspected. The level of proof they required before taking these actions is unknown (2018, p. 17). In other words, this was done without supervision from legal authorities and proper means of inquiry. If someone is suspected to be a terrorist, they were killed for crimes that were not proven by a court of law.

Another major problem posed by the CJTF has been the abuse of civilians in the guise of security. The CJTF has been accused of stealing property and food of the displaced people. They have also been accused of stealing rations meant for the Internally Displaced People in their camps and claiming it to be payment for their contribution to security. This has extended to a long culture of community exploitation, where civil citizens are asked for money by the CJTF for extra protection of property and houses. Also, this has led to the diversion of humanitarian aid, which members of the group divert into a money making business and keep the proceeds for their private needs (Center for Civilian in Conflict, 2018).

Members of the CJTF have also been accused of sexual violence all across Borno State. Sexual violence until the Yugoslavian war of 1992 was a crime that was considered as an inevitable part of war. For years, soldiers and rebels groups have been faulted for raping women and children during war. However, it was considered to be a part of war that could not be prosecuted as a crime due to lack of evidence. The Yugoslavian war of 1992 changed this narrative. The Criminal tribunal set up after the war was the first court to internationally consider sexual violence as a war crime.

Notwithstanding, it's still a crime that goes on till date. The abuses carried out by the CJTF ranges from sexual assault, to physical violence such as beatings, rape and being forced to perform oral sex (Stand to End Rape Initiative, 2017).

Drug abuse and drug trading has also been a major problem in the CJTF. In 2017, the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai, admitted in a press conference that the Nigerian Military has been able to detect some of the members of the CJTF as drug users and have recommended that their service be terminated while they receive the proper help they deserve. In his comment, he observed that it is the use of these drugs that influence them into committing crime war crimes like sexual abuse and extortion from civilian. On the other hand, other members of the CJTF when interviewed by Leadership Newspaper admitted that the Nigerian Military soldiers were also involved in the use of drugs and even the sales of said drugs.

In an attempt to resolve this problem without ignoring the contributions of the CJTF to the security of Borno state, the United Nations commended the group on its impacts but also created an Action Plan in 2016 that was signed by the CJTF leader, Lawan Jaffar. This Action Plan was to create a monitoring and reporting mechanism that would actively end the recruitment of children into the CJTF. Since the signing of this Action Plan, there has been no update on the outcome and if the plan was successful in reaching its goal.

However, the major reason NSAs cannot be held responsible for their crimes is the fact that they have no legal framework. Boot (2013) argues that if NSAs can be provided with the legal means to dictate and control their activities, they become answerable to the state for their actions, which will limit the crimes they commit.

Another major challenge and negative impact of having NSAs insecurity stem from the probability for the state to lose control of the activities of these groups. For instance, in Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Force has been accused and found guilty of war crimes and is responsible for the killing of members from the Hutu clan (Bowi, 2016). The fact that most NSAs in security governance remain unconstitutional, the uncertainty of their methodology in carrying out their civic duties remains unpredictable. In 2014, 21 members of the CJTF were arraigned for the unlawful killings of suspected members of the Boko Haram Insurgency in their custody (Adaji, 2014).

Nonetheless, like many other NSAs in the security sector, the CJTF has had a major impact on security in Borno State. Their impact cannot be overemphasized which is why they have attracted the attention of international organizations. The United Nations Development Programme held a training program in July 2019 that included the CJTF and other vigilante groups in the Northern region of Nigeria. This training exercise was aimed at teaching these NSAs human rights and leadership. This training exercise had the objective of reorientation members of the CJTF and other vigilante groups on how to more sensitive in addressing suspected criminals, cooperation with legitimate state agents, better manage crisis situations without the constant abuse of human rights. At the training, they were advised to look at their role as a gateway to restoring peace and safety in communities and desist from using inhuman actions to attain that (UNDP Nigeria, 2019).

Conclusion: Prospects for NSAs in Community Policing

The discuss on engaging NSAs in the security sector and governance is very important as to closely examine the possibilities but also the challenges that vis-a-vis promoting a safer community for the people in Borno state. However, there are problems that come with engaging actors who are not legally binding by the law. This raises a lot of questions for the government and how they plan on dealing with the problems that NSAs in the security sector pose. For instance, the excessive use of force by NSAs plays a vital role in discouraging states to induct community policing despite its benefits to communities. The use of excessive force by NSAs is a serious problem that is not just significant to Nigeria. However, Alemika (2010) proposes that the use of excessive force is not

singular to NSAs in Nigeria. State agents have been known to using excessive force to manipulating the citizens of Nigeria while violating their fundamental human rights at the same time. For instance, the end of 2018 and beginning of 2019 marked a significant era in Nigeria's history as citizens began a campaign to put an end to the abuse of human rights carried out by the Anti Robbery Unit of the Nigerian Police Force. Even before this era, the military coups that engulfed Nigeria came with the use of excessive force, to which the Nigerian Army claimed was to maintain peace and end corruption.

Another challenge that the Nigerian government has been posed with is the abuse of power that comes with legalizing a group of NSAs into security. The familiarity and knowledge that local groups have of their communities can be a positive and negative thing. For instance, the Ibile vigilante group in Lagos state has been said to be one of the most active vigilante groups in the country. However, their bid to be legitimized by the Lagos state government has proven futile for their constant abuse of power. They have been accused and some of their members arrested for drug trafficking, extortion of money from people that live in their communities and also causing physical harm to people whom they believe are criminals.

In contrast, Oluwaniyi (2011) argues that the Nigerian government is responsible for the abuse of power that is exercised by both the state institution and NSAs. Impunity has been a major setback for the Nigerian government as man crimes (even financial crimes with backing evidence) go unpunished. However, for community policing to work and be generally accepted, there are some factors that must be considered in terms of the realization and legitimizing of NSAs.

The first factor is the *political environment*. The Nigerian government must be able to first create an atmosphere that supports community policing. Alemika (2010) posits that before the Nigerian State can consider state policing, it should run a data study proving empirically that community policing can work. It is also important that the Nigerian government first decentralize the power of the national police and allow for state policing which can, in turn, give way for community policing. In the case of the Arbakai group in Afghanistan, the group had so much significance to restoring peace to large and small communities that the Afghan government allowed for a test run. Schmeidl (2009) stated that 'In 2007, the Governors of Khost and Paktia decided to put the Arbakai more permanently on the government payroll for one year. At that time each district was to have between 20–40 Arbakai guards responsible for law and order' (2009, p. 327).

Another factor the Nigerian government must consider is the *legal framework*. In trying to manage NSAs, the Nigerian government must adjust the constitution to allow for community policing. Presently, the 1999 constitution has vested all power of security to the Nigerian Police Force, thereby not allowing for any other body to be formed outside the creation of the Nigerian Police Force. For community policing to work and for NSAs to be held for their crimes, it is important that the Nigerian government creates a legal binding making them legitimate forces.

NSAs have played a vital role in the molding of the international system. Their impacts, whether negative or positive have been immense, to say the least. However, for NSAs in the security sector and governance, it is evident that the threats they pose to the survival of a state are threatening. Notwithstanding, community policing has been successful in many developed countries, meaning that the idea of having community police is not the issue but how to practicalize it in a developing country like Nigeria. It is evident that first, the culture of impunity that is rampant in the Nigerian state can attest to reason why the government might not be willing to look into legalizing more bodies to carry arms. The Nigerian government is already faced with challenges of police brutality. A problem that seems to be rising day by day. This problem not only complicates the relationship of the state and its citizens but also dampens the democracy the country has struggled to build in 20 years.

This study recommends that a conducive political environment must first exist if the Nigerian government wishes to approach community policing. There needs to be a no tolerance policy on the abuse of human rights and freedom. If the current state forces such as the Nigerian Police Force cannot be controlled or brought to justice by the Nigerian government, how can they assure that they can control the activities of the community police? This is why it is important that the Nigerian state creates a conducive political environment.

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